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Abstract
A broad array of law enforcement strategies, from income tax to bank regulation,
involve self-reporting by regulated agents and auditing of some fraction of the
reports by the regulating bureau. Standard models of self-reporting strategies
assume that although bureaus only have estimates of the of an agent’s type, agents
know the ability of bureaus to detect their misreports. We relax this assumption,
and posit that agents only have an estimate of the auditing capabilities of bureaus.
Enriching the model to allow two-sided private information changes the behavior
of bureaus. A bureau that is weak at auditing, may wish to mimic a bureau that is
strong. Strong bureaus may be able to signal their capabilities, but at a cost. We
explore the pooling, separating, and semi-separating equilibria that result, and the
policy implications. Important possible outcomes are that a cap on penalties
increases compliance, audit hit rates are not informative of the quality of bureau
behavior, and by mimicking strong bureaus even weak bureaus can induce
compliance.
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Those charged with enforcing laws or regulations, or rules of any sort,
(collectively bureaus) often require regulated entities or individuals (agents) to
submit reports on their activities. Bureaus enforce compliance by auditing the
reports and imposing punishments when misreporting is identified. For example, a
bureau charged with enforcing environmental laws might require polluters to
report whether they are in compliance. A bureau charged with enforcing
occupational safety rules might require companies to report accidents. In both
cases, it is common practice to audit some fraction of reports and to impose
penalties when underreporting is discovered. Similarly, tax administrators rely
heavily on self-reporting of tax liability and audit only a fraction of reports.
Prosecutors or police regularly ask for self-reports from suspects by asking for a
confession. They offer to lower the criminal sanction for a confession. Higher
sanctions for failure to confess if guilt is ultimately assessed is akin to a sanction
for underreporting. Contracts, commercial relationships, and personal
relationships may use similar principles.
The apparent purpose of this type of enforcement system, which we will
call an SRA—self-report audit—strategy, is to reduce enforcement costs. If only a
fraction of reports has to be audited, costs may be lower than the alternative of
directly monitoring a population. For this strategy to work, however, agents must
have an incentive to send in informative reports. In some settings only biased
reports can be expected. Reports of emissions, accidents, and income may be
shaved downwards if agents suspect that there will be little expected cost to doing
so. In many settings, however, appropriate incentives can elicit accurate reports. If
agents know, for example, that an inaccurate report is likely to be detected and
punished, they may send in accurate reports rather than face sanctions.
Most of the literature on auditing and self-reporting considers the case
where a regulated party has private information and the goal of the reporting
system is to induce the individual to reveal that information. 1 The regulated party
1

The modern statement of the problem in the tax enforcement context began with, J.F.
REINGANUM & L. WILDE, Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework, 26 Journal of
Public Economics 1 (1985). In the tax context, see also, K.C. BORDER & J SOBEL, Samurai
accountant: A theory of auditing and plunder, 54 Review of Economic Studies 525 (1987); D.
MOOKHERJEE & I. PNG, Optimal auditing, insurance, and redistribution, 104 Quarterly Journal of
Economics 399 (1989); H. CREMER & F GAHVARI, Tax evation and the optimum general income
tax, 60 Journal of Public Economics 235(1996); P. CHANDER & L. WILDE, A general
characteriziation of optimal income tax enforcement, 65 Review of Economic Studies 165(1998);
and SUSAN SCOTCHMER, Audit classes and tax enforcement policy, 77 American Economic
Review: Papers and Proceedings 229 (1987). In the torts context, see LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN
SHAVELL, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior, 102 Journal of Political
Economy 583 (1994). Auditing in the environmental context has been studied by ARUN S. MALIK,
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is assumed to know the capabilities of the auditing bureau. Individuals, for
example, are assumed to know the ability of the tax administrator to catch cheats.
Criminals deciding whether to confess are assumed to know what information the
government has against them, and the likelihood of a successful prosecution.
The world would be a simpler place, and law and economics of much less
interest, if these information conditions were widely found. We suspect, however,
that in many cases, the agent is unsure about the capabilities of the bureau
because the agent knows neither the auditing technology that the bureau
possesses, nor the information it already has.
In such cases, there is not just one information asymmetry, but two. Thus,
we drop the assumption that the agent knows what the bureau knows, and
consider the enriched auditing problem. The agent is assumed to have private
information about its behavior or type, but to have at best imperfect knowledge of
the quality of the bureau’s auditing capability, which is private information to the
bureau. 2 For example, an individual seeking to hide assets in a foreign bank
account has only a rough estimate of how likely the tax administrator is to find
them. A polluter required to report environmental emissions is not certain whether
the bureau can detect its emissions. Criminals deciding whether to confess may
not know what evidence the government has against them.
How should the bureau set an SRA strategy when its auditing capabilities
are private information, which agents can only infer? This additional asymmetry
changes the game between the parties. Bureaus will act strategically to convey or
Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution, 24 Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management (1993). For a general review of the auditing
literature, see JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & DAVID MARTIMORT, The Theory of Incentives
(Princeton University Press. 2002), p. 121-125.
2
A very similar environment is studied by Mark B. Cronshaw and James Alm, Tax Compliance
with Two-Sided Uncertainty, 23 Public Finance Quarterly 139-166 (1995). In their model, both
the agent and the bureau have private information. However, the bureau in their model cannot
commit to an auditing policy. Hence, their analysis does not encompass the signaling aspects that
form the core of our analysis. I. MACHO-STADLER & J.D. PEREZ-CASTRILLO, Auditing with
signals, 69 Economica 1(2002) presents a model where the tax authority receives a private signal
of the taxpayer’s income, so they have two-sided private information similar to ours. In our
structure, unlike theirs, the bureau’s private information need not be correlated with the taxpayer’s
income and may reflect general features of the environment. Moreover, in their model, the bureau
has to declare an audit strategy before it receives the private signal whereas in ours, the bureau
knows its auditing capabilities before setting a strategy. Other authors have considered the
possibility of imperfect auditing. See, e.g., H.C. CHEN & S.M. LIU, Incentive contracts under
imperfect auditing, 76 The Manchester School Working Paper Series 131 (2008); D.P. BARON &
D. BESANKO, Regulation, asymmetric information, and auditing, 15 RAND Journal of Economics
447 (1984) and ARUN S. MALIK, Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating
Stochastic Pollution, 24 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (1993).
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avoid conveying information about their capabilities. A bureau with good auditing
capabilities might engage in costly signaling to convince agents of this fact.
Absent private information about bureaus, such signaling would be wasteful. A
bureau with weak capabilities might mimic its stronger peers to enhance its
deterrent capability. In both cases, signaling and mimicking strategies have to
consider how both agents and other bureau types will react. The strategies must
operate in an equilibrium where bureaus are strategic, and agents try to infer
information about their quality and then send in reports given the inferences they
draw.
Policymakers may have a strategy option as well. Sometimes they will want
to encourage mimicking by weak bureaus to allow them to better enforce laws
where auditing is difficult, but at other times they will want to encourage strong
bureaus to differentiate themselves to aid their enforcement. Given that agents
draw information about one bureau from the behavior of others, however, there
will be cross-bureau externalities. Policymakers will have to consider overall
strategies and appropriately balance the costs and benefits of mimicking versus
signaling, essentially of pooling and separating equilibria.
We provide core intuitions and legal applications of such a model. A
formal model and proofs of our results appear elsewhere. 3 We begin with
motivating examples, describe the core features of our model, and then turn to
applications.
1.

Motivating examples

Bureaus often use self-reporting to enforce laws or regulations. There are
numerous straightforward examples, such as the self-reporting system used by
most countries for taxation or a requirement to report environmental spills.4
Banks are required to report their levels of capital to bank regulators. 5 Drivers are
required to report traffic accidents to the police. Companies are required to report
financial information to various regulators. 6 Drug companies are required to
report adverse reactions and device makers must submit declarations of
conformity to the Food and Drug Administration. 7 OSHA requires employers to
report incidents within 8 hours. 8
3

Kotowski, Weisbach, and Zeckhauser, working paper, cite.
40 CFR 110 (requirement to report discharges of oil) and 40 CFR 302 (reporting requirements
for hazardous substances)
5
Basle II.5, implemented at 77 Fed Reg. No. 169 (August 30, 2012).
6
Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
7
21 CFR 803.10
8
29 CFR 1904.39(a).
4

3

Self-reporting can also arise in contexts where the actions are not
conventional reports. Any time one party asks another for information to enforce
a stricture, they are effectively using the self-reporting strategy. In criminal law,
asking for a confession or just interviewing a suspect is effectively asking for a
self-report. The police or prosecutors may encourage self-reporting by offering to
reduce penalties in exchange for a confession or for turning yourself in. They may
“audit” self-reports by deciding if and when to seek further evidence. Contracting
parties may ask about the progress of performance, effectively asking the other
party for a report. A misreport can lead to the loss of future business or a lawsuit.
The recent Supreme Court decision, Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of
Arizona, 9 concerned a self-reporting strategy. The National Voter Registration
Act, a federal law, requires that applicants self-declare their eligibility rather than
provide documentary evidence. This is a self-reporting system. Arizona instead
wanted a system where people had to prove their eligibility. Although the Court
decided the case on preemption grounds, an important ongoing dispute about
voter identification revolves around the effectiveness of a self-reporting strategy.
Because of its prominence, the SRA strategy has received attention from
both legal scholars and economists. 10 A basic result is that the strategy often
makes sense. In a setting where the goal is deterrence, setting the penalty for bad
behavior that is self-reported slightly lower than the expected penalty for the
behavior when it is not self-reported, creates an incentive for truthful reports
without changing the first-order effects of the underlying law. 11 To illustrate,
consider a risk-neutral agent who engages in a sanctionable activity. If the agent
does not self-report a violation, the fine is $1,000, and the probability that the
bureau detects the violation is 10%, implying that the expected sanction is $100.
If the sanction on an agent who self-reports is $99, the agent is better off
reporting, but there is no first-order change in the sanction. Enforcement costs,
however, are reduced, which enables this self-reporting system to out perform a
system that relies on direct monitoring.

9

570 U.S. __ (2013).
See notes 1 and 2 supra. For a summary of the legal literature, see MITCHELL POLINSKY &
STEVEN SHAVELL, The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, in Handbook of Law and
Econoomics (Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
11
See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, note 1. This example is taken from POLINSKY & SHAVELL, id. p. 437438. Note that Kaplow and Shavell do not include the costs of self-reporting in their model. These
costs may be significant. They conclude only that the strategy of requiring self-reports plus audits
saves enforcement costs, not that it saves the sum of enforcement and compliance costs.
10
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Most of the existing models have a similar structure: the agent has private
information about his situation which he reports to the bureau. The bureau then
audits some of the reports according to a policy that depends on what is reported.
The novel element of our analysis is that bureaus differ in their capabilities.
Moreover, though bureaus know their capabilities, agents do not. Agents only
have a subjective probability distribution. Capabilities differ because some
bureaus are better able to detect the truth or have more audit resources. For
example, the IRS can easily detect hidden income when it has information returns
from payers. A taxpayer may not know how effectively the IRS matches
information returns with individuals’ returns, but has some estimate of the
probability. In other cases, the bureau may not be able to detect the truth or may
be able to do so only at significant cost. The IRS has a difficult time finding
income that is well-hidden in foreign jurisdictions. It has no easy tracing
technology, but it may have secret sharing arrangements with foreign banks. A
taxpayer with assets stashed overseas may not know what behind-the-scenes
contacts the IRS has established with the foreign government or foreign payers
(e.g., Swiss banks). He can only estimate what the IRS knows.
This two-sided asymmetric information problem describes many, but by no
means all, auditing situations. With the IRS, for example, audits are not
publicized; they are considered private information between the IRS and the
taxpayer, unless an audit dispute ends up in court. This means that individuals are
unlikely to know the true auditing capabilities of the IRS as this information is
revealed coarsely and sporadically. The IRS, understanding this dynamic, puffs its
capabilities just prior to the April 15 filing deadline by publicizing multiple taxfraud cases. 12
Criminal investigations also likely involve two-sided private information.
The police asking a suspect for a self-report—Professor Plum, did you have the
revolver in the conservatory? —may purposefully keep the extent of their
knowledge secret believing that they get better revelation by doing so. 13
In other cases, most or nearly all information about the bureau’s auditing
capabilities are public. The bureau may have to publish its examination
procedures which may be purely mechanical. Or a large entity that is audited
frequently may have institutional knowledge of the quality of audits, as may
12

JOSHUA BLANK & DANIEL LEVIN, When is Tax Enforcement Publicized, 30 Virginia Tax
Review 1(2010).
13
They may even forego revealing information in one case where it would be helpful, if they think
it better to keep suspects guessing in cases where they do not have information.
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professional advisors, such as lawyers and accountants. Nevertheless, the real
world throws up a variety of cases where two-sided private information is present
and important. In them, new questions get posed; new results emerge.
2.

Basic structure of the model

Our formal model, like most, simplifies for clarity and tractability. We
describe the basic structure of the model using nontechnical terminology.
There is a single, risk-neutral agent who must comply with a particular
stricture, such as paying tax liability, using a mandated pollution control
technology, providing a safe workplace, or complying with a contract. There are
only two types of agents, High and Low. (A more complex model would allow for
multiple types.) For example, a taxpayer may earn high or low income, a polluter
may have high levels or low levels of emissions, a criminal may be guilty or
innocent, and so forth. The agent’s type—High or Low—is private information,
known initially only to the agent, although the bureau knows the probability that
the agent is High or Low. The agent must report his type to the bureau, possibly
accurately, possibly not. For example, a high-earning taxpayer might report that
he earned a high amount and pay the associated tax liability, or he might
underreport and pay a lower amount. A polluter might report that it is using the
mandated technology (equivalent to a low report) or that it is not (a high report).
A crime suspect may confess or claim innocence. In each case, the misreport
precipitates a punishment if discovered during an audit.
The risk-neutral bureau receives the report and decides whether to audit the
agent. As with agents, there are two types of bureaus, strong and weak. A strong
bureau will discover the agent’s type if it chooses to audit. A weak bureau will
not. (We assume the extreme case where strong bureaus are perfect auditors and
weak bureaus completely hopeless. Realistic cases will lie in between.) The
bureau knows its type; the agent has only a subjective probability on those types.
In all cases, each audit costs the bureau a fixed amount money. 14
If a bureau audits the agent and finds that a High agent falsely claimed to be
a Low agent, the agent will be penalized. A third party, such as Congress,
determines the maximum penalty that the bureau can impose. Within these preset
bounds, however, the bureau may impose any penalty that it finds justified. 15 A
truthful report never gets penalized. That is, there are no type I errors in which the
14

For simplicity, we do not include the agent’s cost of audit.
As we argue below, the bounds set by Congress on the bureau’s policies are a key factor behind
the effectiveness of its enforcement actions. Perhaps surprisingly, leaving the bureau
unconstrained may not be the best policy.
15
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agent truthfully reports being Low but the audit concludes (incorrectly) that he is
High. 16
Three critical assumptions define the game. First, objectives: Agents seek
to minimize their expected costs; bureaus seek to maximize their expected
revenue net of costs. In the tax case, the IRS chooses its audit and penalty
structure to maximize the sum of tax payments plus penalties less audit costs. If it
is using effluent charges, the EPA maximizes the charge plus the penalties for
misreporting less audit costs.
If a bureau imposes mandates, the bureau uses the shadow value of the
mandate, (i.e., the behavioral change produced by the mandate multiplied by the
shadow price on that change), instead of receipts in the maximand. For example,
if the EPA imposes a pollution control mandate, such as a best available control
technology rule, it maximizes the reduction in pollution times the shadow price of
a unit reduction, plus penalties for misreporting, less audit costs. Prosecutors
maximize the shadow value of imprisoning a guilty individual times convictions
less the costs of investigating.
An alternative would have the bureau set the audit and penalty rates to
maximize compliance with the law. If compliance were the goal, penalties would
be a means to an end, not an end in themselves. Penalties would not enter directly
into the bureau’s maximand.
Many bureaus likely come closer to maximizing revenue than compliance.
They may do so implicitly in response to the internal incentives of their
employees. Thus, an individual policeman might increase his chances for
promotion by maximizing arrests and fines rather than adopting a strategy that
reduces crime and produces few arrests. Without arrests, he may not be able to
show to his superiors that he is doing his job. Prosecutors may maximize
convictions rather than compliance for similar reasons. Police seeking forfeitures
of property may prefer to maximize total revenue rather than just compliance
because they are often allowed to keep the forfeited items. Bureaus may also
maximize revenue because their overall performance is evaluated on this basis.
For example, a tax bureau may be evaluated based on the revenue it brings in.
While maximizing revenue may not be the goal of all agencies, it is likely an
important objective for many.

16

There is no penalty for over-paying: if a low-type agent claims to be a high type agent, he pays
the fee associated with his declaration. This, however, does not happen in our model.
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Second, our formulation posits that the underlying legal rule that is being
enforced is set separately from the audit and enforcement strategy. For example,
we assume that the tax schedule and allowable penalties are set by Congress while
the audit and enforcement strategy is set by the IRS. The same separation holds
for criminal law (crimes and punishments are specified by the legislature, but
enforcement is left to the police and prosecutors), for environmental law, and
most other contexts where bureaus use SRA strategies to enforce the law.
Such separation of rule and enforcement procedure can be costly. Ideally, a
policymaker would consider the legal rule and its enforcement mechanism
simultaneously, thereby optimizing the net effect. 17 One way to view our
approach is to posit that the underlying legal rules are specified, and that bureaus
then address the enforcement problem. Given this formulation, legislatures could
design legal rules taking the enforcement solution as a constraint on this problem.
The overall optimization would then be a two-stage game with different players
controlling the two stages. 18 The restriction is invoked not primarily to simplify
the problem, but rather to reflect reality. In many cases it reflects how policies are
actually set, with Congress setting the substantive rules but delegating
enforcement to an agency.
Third, a bureau can commit to an audit strategy. It announces that strategy,
and the agent sends in a report. If the audit strategy elicits truthful reports, the
bureau has no incentive to audit, and would prefer not to given that audits cost
money. However, today’s actions serve as tomorrow’s announced audit strategy,
which reduces any temptation to break commitments. 19 If the bureau has a
continuing existence, as virtually all do, the commitment problem vanishes.
3.

Results and applications

If bureau capabilities are private information, agents must guess whether
they are reporting to a strong bureau or a weak bureau. If agents believe that the
bureau is weak, they can report a low amount with impunity. If they believe that
the bureau is strong, they have to expect the possibility of audits and penalties if
they send in a low report.

17

Some of the auditing literature allows both the underlying legal rule and the audit mechanism to
be set simultaneously. See REINGANUM & WILDE, note 1.
18
This approach is taken in I. SANCHEZ & J. SOBEL, Hierachical design and enforcement of
income tax policies, 50 Journal of Public Economics 345 (1993).
19
For examples of a model without commitment, see F. KAHIL, Auditing without commitment, 28
RAND Journal of Economics 629(1997), and MARK B CRONSHAW & JAMES ALM, Tax
Compliance with Two-Sided Uncertainty, 23 Public Finance Quarterly 139(1995).
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Because agents will report based on their beliefs about the bureau’s auditing
capability, bureaus have an incentive to act so that agents will believe they are
strong and make truthful reports. Weak bureaus thus have an incentive to mimic
strong bureaus; strong bureaus have an incentive to deter mimicking by
“signaling:” taking actions that weak bureaus would find costly to follow. A
strong bureau that is able to ensure that agents know it is strong may be able to
save on auditing costs. These mimicking and signaling behaviors drive our
conclusions.
The interplay between agents trying to infer bureau types and bureaus trying
to mimic and differentiate produces three types of equilibria for bureau strategies:
separating (strong and weak bureaus pursue different audit strategies, and thus
reveal their types), pooling (strong and weak bureaus adopt the same audit
strategy), and semi-separating (some weak bureaus announce the same strategy as
strong bureaus (mimic) and some weak bureaus announce a different strategy
(reveal)). If there is a pooling or semi-separating equilibrium, agents will only
have a probabilistic estimate of a bureau’s type.
The table below summarizes the possibilities. The columns represent the
three equilibria for bureaus: separating, semi-separating, and pooling. The rows
represent the behavior of High agents who may always report their true type (all
Highs honest), sometimes report their true type, or always misreport. The payoffs
to the bureaus are represented by the payoff to strong bureaus, S, to weak bureaus
which mimic the strong bureaus’ strategy, WM, and weak bureaus which do not
mimic strong bureaus and therefore reveal their type, WR.
Bureau Behavior
Agent Behavior

Separating

Semi-Separating

Pooling

All Highs Honest

Not possible

Not possible

WR ≤ WM = S

Some Highs Misreport

WM = WR = S

WR = WM < S

WR ≤ WM < S

All Highs Misreport

Not possible

Not possible

W=S

Below we highlight some of the important cases, focusing in particular on
the two highlighted cases. Before moving to the details, note that in a separating
equilibrium—the first column—agents will always misreport to weak bureaus
because they know which bureaus are weak. Agents may, however, report
accurately to strong bureaus because agents know that they are strong. The table
lists this as “Some Highs Misreport” but it is important to keep in mind that this

9

means that if there are some weak bureaus and some strong bureaus, all Highs are
likely report honestly to strong bureaus and will misreport to weak bureaus. This
characterization is based on interpreting the model as involving many bureaus,
some strong and some weak. In this case, Highs will sometimes misreport (to
weak bureaus) and sometimes report honestly (to strong bureaus). In the semiseparating and pooling cases, however, an agent will not be certain of a bureau’s
capability and may decide that a mixed reporting strategy is optimal (see below).
The bottom right corner—pooling, all Highs misreport—describes the
case where audits are too expensive to be worthwhile, even for strong bureaus. If
there are no audits, all Highs report being Low because there is no sanction. Weak
bureaus also do not audit, so they receive the same reports and their revenue is the
same as the revenue of strong bureaus. We use W in this case rather than WM
because although the weak bureau is doing the same thing as the strong bureau, it
is doing just what it would do if its type were revealed rather than mimicking.
3.1

Maximum penalties

A standard result in law and economics is that optimal enforcement
involves a very low audit rate and very high punishments. 20 Parodying this
conclusion, once a decade someone should be executed for double parking.
This approach to law enforcement is rarely observed and commentators
have offered a variety of reasons why it may not be optimal. For example, if
individuals are risk averse (and liability is strict, not fault-based), the strategy of
exorbitant fines and low audit probabilities imposes undue risk-bearing costs.21
Similarly, under a theory known as “general enforcement,” if a single
enforcement activity detects more than one kind of sanctionable activity, the
probability of detection will be the same for those activities. If the levels of harm
they impose differ notably, the optimal fine will correspondingly vary, and in
many cases be below the maximum allowed. 22 Thus, if a highway patrolman
observes both reckless driving and driving without a seatbelt, the vastly different

20

GARY BECKER, Crime and Punishment: An economic approach, 72 Journal of Political
Economy 169 (1968).
21
MITCHELL POLINSKY & STEVEN SHAVELL, The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and
Magnitude of Fines, 69 American Economic Review 880(1979). See MITCHELL POLINSKY &
STEVEN SHAVELL, A Note on Optimal Fines when Wealth Varies Among Individuals, American
Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings (1991). MITCHELL POLINSKY & STEVEN SHAVELL,
Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probabiliy of Fines, 35 Journal of Law and
Economics 133 (1992).
22
STEVEN SHAVELL, Specific v. General Enforcemnet of Law, 99 Journal of Political Economy
1088 (1992).
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levels of expected harm caused by these violations implies that there penalties
should differ. 23
Our model identifies an additional reason why a policymaker may wish to
limit the penalties that a bureau is able to impose. By constraining a bureau’s
abilities to differentiate itself by using high penalties, the policymaker can lend
credence to the signaling actions taken by a bureau or can ensure that a pooling
outcome remains viable. If signaling or mimicking is desirable – i.e.,
policymakers want bureaus to be in one of the highlighted boxes – a cap on
penalties may be desirable.
We use a numerical example to illustrate why this is the case in a separating
equilibrium. (We discuss caps on penalties in pooling equilibria in Part 3.3.) The
basic idea is to identify what it takes to be in one of the highlighted boxes and to
rule out the possibility that a bureau can deviate from that strategy. The cap on
penalties enables this across a range of contexts; it rules out profitable deviations,
particularly by strong bureaus.
Suppose that 20% of the people have high income, produce high pollution,
or a high amount of whatever the underlying variable is, and 80% have a low
amount. The statutory payment or shadow value for High is 11; for Low it is 5.
Audits cost 2.5.
Consider the highlighted separating equilibrium (the first column in the
table) where agents report accurately to strong bureaus but not to weak bureaus
(middle row). Suppose that for this to occur the bureau must audit 50% of low
reports.
For agents to report accurately, the probability of being caught times the
penalty from being caught has to outweigh the benefits of misreporting. In
particular, if a High agent reports 5, half the time he is not audited and only pays
5. The other half of the time, he is audited and pays 11+P where P is the penalty
for inaccurate reports. To convince the agent to report accurately, this outcome
must be worse than reporting High and paying 11:
23

Another explanation is that sanctions may need to be set to create progressively increasing
deterrence for progressively worse activities. If we set the highest possible sanction for double
parking, we cannot impose yet a higher sanction for stealing and a higher one yet for murder. This
explanation is similar to (and may be identical to) the general enforcement explanation as it only
holds if that the probability of enforcement cannot be fully adjusted across activities. Note also
that the declarations setup creates substitution possibilities across under reports. If truthful
reporting is not feasible, it may be desirable to reduce the penalty on mild under reports to induce
agents to make them in lieu of severe under reports, for example, to report 80% of income rather
than 60% of income.

11

0.5 × 5 + 0.5 × (11 + P ) ≥ 11.
The penalty, therefore, must be at least 6 to induce the agent to report
accurately.
This principle is well known: the expected sanction must be sufficiently
high if inaccurate reporting is to be unwise. Where there are two types of bureaus
and a separating equilibrium, however, a second bound comes into play. In a
separating equilibrium, a weak bureau cannot gain by mimicking a strong bureau.
Agents have no incentive to report more than 5 to a bureau known to be
weak, since they know that the bureau cannot audit effectively. Therefore, absent
mimicking, the most that a weak bureau can earn is 5. If a strong bureau had an
audit strategy that earned more than 5 and induced all agents to report honestly, a
weak bureau would mimic the strong bureau by adopting the identical strategy
and, therefore earn that same greater than 5 amount. The fact that a weak bureau
cannot enforce penalties would matter not at all because agents are reporting
truthfully. There are no penalties to collect. This means that to prevent mimicking
when Highs report honestly, a strong bureau cannot have a strategy that produces
net revenue after audit costs of more than 5. We need to rule out all such
counterfactual strategies.
Consider a strategy that yields more than 5 by inducing High agents to
report Low and then imposing penalties. The strategy will involve a penalty P and
an audit rate of low reports α>0. The bureau’s revenue is made up of payments
from (1) the 80% of the agents who truthfully report Low less the wasted audit
costs (α x 2.5) for these agents, plus (2) the 20% who inaccurately report Low, a
fraction (1-α) of whom are not audited plus (3) the 20% who inaccurately report
Low, a fraction α of whom are audited and pay High plus penalties. This sum
must be at most 5:

Since α>0, the only way for this equation to be satisfied is if≤ P6.5. To
maintain the equilibrium, a strong bureau must not have the ability to impose a
penalty greater than 6.5.
When allowable penalties exceed this limit, a semi-separating equilibrium
results. Strong bureaus lower their audit rate and collect more penalties relative to
when the penalty is less than 6.5. Weak bureaus will mix it up: they will
sometimes mimic the strategy used by strong bureaus and sometimes reveal
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themselves by announcing a “no audit” strategy. Agents seeing a strategy that
involves auditing will no longer be sure what type of bureau they are dealing with
and they too will mix it up, sometimes reporting accurately and sometimes not. In
particular, to decide how often to report accurately, High agents will consider the
audit rate and penalties, and their estimate of the probability that the bureau they
face is strong or weak. In the end, some High agents will comply, some will not
comply and get away with their transgression, and some noncompliers will get
caught and pay the mandated penalty. 24
Compared to the case where penalties are below the bound, compliance is
lower because High agents sometimes report Low rather than always reporting
truthfully. They are no longer sure what type of bureau they are dealing with. That
dilutes their incentives to report accurately. Higher penalties increase the
likelihood of mimicking and, therefore, can actually reduce compliance.
This conclusion clashes with a simplistic view that higher penalties lead to
greater compliance. Someone who is “tough on crime,” for example, might want
to increase penalties. A claim that higher penalties increases compliance,
however, requires holding all else equal, particularly the audit rates bureaus
announce, and the inferences that agents make about a bureau’s capabilities given
its chosen behavior. Higher penalties may well lead to lower compliance as these
factors may shift.
3.2 Monitoring of bureaus
Suppose the ultimate principal, such as the legislature, the executive, or a
citizen, wishes to determine whether a bureau’s SRA strategy is being
implemented effectively. The most straightforward approach would be to observe
whether agents comply with the law, but if the principal cannot directly observe
compliance, it may have to turn to other indicators of effectiveness. One
superficially appealing possibility is audit hit rates: the principal might ask
whether the bureau’s effectively marshals its resources by asking whether the
bureau is targeting its audits to regularly find noncompliance. For example, the
chair of the Ways and Means Committee, which oversees the IRS, might expect
to see the IRS use its audit resources to frequently find tax cheating. Another
24

Although it is tempting to interpret the mixed strategy of a High agent literally, we recognize
that only a few people actually flip a game-theoretic coin when deciding on a course of action.
Instead, our preferred interpretation of this arrangement is to view the mixed strategy of a High
agent as capturing the aggregate behavior of a large population of High agents. The action taken
by a particular agent may be driven by another (unmodeled) variable—such as his predisposition
to embarrassment or his moral rectitude—that becomes pivotal when bureau strategies equate or
nearly equate the monetary returns to the two actions.
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possibility is that the principal might look to see whether the bureau is wasting
money, such as by spending it on fancy buildings or conferences.
Much as with penalties, where failure to consider the equilibrium effects
can lead to misguided intuitions, an assessment of bureau behavior that fails to
consider the potential equilibria from an SRA strategy may be misleading. We
cannot determine from the audit hit rate whether the bureau is using a good SRA
strategy: audit hit rates of any level are consistent with optimal strategies. And we
may very well see bureaus engaging in what looks like wasteful activity even
when they are acting optimally. Auditing the auditors is a complex task when
agents must infer bureau capabilities. Both conclusions—audit hit rates are not
reliably informative and bureaus may engage in what looks like wasteful
activity—follow immediately from the analysis above.
Start with apparently wasteful activity. Strong bureaus have an incentive to
engage in what looks like wasteful activity to prevent mimicking. Consider again
the highlighted separating equilibrium box in the table. In the numerical example
illustrating this case, the strong bureau’s revenue will be 5.2, made up of 5 from
the 80% of reports that are low less the costs of auditing half of these plus 11
from the 20% of reports that are high:

If a strong bureau earns 5.2, however, a mimicking weak bureau would also
earn 5.2. (If the weak bureau is able to mimic, penalties are never imposed so its
inability to audit effectively is mute.) To prevent mimicking, the weak bureau
cannot earn more than 5. This means that a strong bureau must adopt a strategy
that would reduce the revenue collected by a mimicking weak bureau to below 5.
(That is, in the notation we use above, WM = WR = S.) Oftentimes, this ancillary
activity also costs the strong bureau dearly.
A strong bureau has several strategies for discouraging mimicry by a weak
counterpart. Typically, a strong bureau must distort its behavior in a seemingly
wasteful manner. For example, it can increase the frequency of auditing low
reports beyond 50%. Holding the penalty fixed at 6.5 and increasing the audit rate
does not alter agents’ behavior. High agents continue to report truthfully. For
example, if the bureau audited 60% of low reports, then its expected profits would
equal 5. This extra 10% of audits is “wasted” because it neither deters
misreporting (there was none at 50% auditing) nor collects any fines, since there
is no misreporting.
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Alternatively, the bureau can “burn money” by auditing high reports. While
these audits would be useless in the sense that they will never find
noncompliance, they may indicate the bureau’s auditing strategy is fair in that all
agents can get audited.
And it can spend the 0.2 of revenue on fancy architecture or conferences.
While these expenditures seem on a quick examination to be purely wasteful, they
may not be. If High agents believe that a bureau that does not burn money is
weak, they will not report accurately. For example, a bureau that has an office in a
run-down building may appear incapable of conducting effective audits. These
inferences will affect agent behavior and possibly lower compliance. Trying to
save money may be self-defeating.
Above we have identified but three possible actions a strong bureau can
take to reduce the attractiveness of mimicking to the weak bureau. Many more are
possible. Relative to allowing mimicking, however, strong bureaus only gain
when the costs for a weak bureau to do the same exceed those of the strong
bureau. 25
Unfortunately, while “burning money” may be wise, it may instead be
wasteful. The possibility of signaling does not rule out the possibility of
incompetence. Simply observing the potential waste is not enough to determine
whether the activity is signaling or genuine waste.
Observing audit hit rates is no more helpful. Rates of zero—audits fail to
ever turn up noncompliance—arise in the separating equilibrium just analyzed. If
a strong bureau is able to differentiate itself from a weak bureau, agents will want
to report truthfully to that bureau. If agents will report accurately, audits will
never find under reports, and audit hit rates will be zero. We do not expect such
an outcome in practice very often, but it is instructive as a polar case. Imagine a
police chief bragging that there were zero arrests after a major public event or an
accounting firm finding that a company’s financial statements are correct. Failure
to find noncompliance does not mean that the strategy is either flaccid or
inappropriate. The same argument applies as well to the case of a pooling
equilibrium, where all agents are honest, as we discuss below.

25

Thus, if a bureau were strong because its personnel were capable, it might pay for them to get
graduate degrees even if those degrees were of no value in their work. A weak bureau saddled
with less capable personnel would find it too costly to educate its employees similarly. The
situation is analogous to that examined by Michael Spence, Job Market as Signaling, 87 The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 355 (1973).
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Positive audit hit rates are also compatible with optimal strategies. If the
penalty rate is above the 6.5 bound in the above example, agents, inferring
mimicking, will sometimes report inaccurately. Strong bureaus will discover these
inaccuracies when these agents are selected for audit. Moreover, the expected
positive hit rate will depend on important parameters, such as the percentage of
High and Low agents and audit costs, and could be at almost any level.
Unfortunately, both zero and positive hit rates are also compatible with
negligent bureaus. A bureau that is entirely wasteful might have a very low audit
hit rate simply because it is wasteful. A bureau with a high audit hit rate may not
be properly implementing an SRA strategy which would induce more, or fully,
truthful reporting. More information is required to know whether a particular
audit hit rate is appropriate.
The lesson is that when there is two-sided private information, it is perilous
to look at a bureau’s auditing record and naively draw inferences about its
effectiveness. A zero hit rate, any positive hit rate, and seemingly wasteful audits
or other expenditures are compatible with effective audit strategies. These
behaviors are also compatible with an incompetent bureau. A superficial
examination cannot tell the difference. Effectively monitoring a bureau may
require direct information on compliance.
3.3

Mimicry by Weak Bureaus

The possibility that weak bureaus may seek to mimic strong bureaus drove
the discussion above. We turn now to examine when mimicking may occur in
equilibrium, and what the effects may be. In this section, we consider a single
bureau that may be either weak or strong. In the next section, we consider the
possibility that there are many bureaus. In the latter case, agents make inferences
across bureaus, which means that the SRA strategies of bureaus interact.
Mimicry may greatly expand the capacity for socially desirable laws to be
effective. If auditing capabilities are weak, say because the law regulates in an
area where auditing is difficult, laws that are otherwise socially desirable may be
less effective or not even enacted in the first place. If, however, a weak bureau
can masquerade as a strong bureau, it might be able to get agents to send in
accurate reports.
Mimicry only arises when strong bureaus do not fully differentiate
themselves. The key that allows such an equilibrium is that the maximum
allowable penalty is not too large to induce a strong bureau to have the incentive
to lower audit rates and cash in on penalties on under-reporting. A weak bureau
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cannot follow such a strategy profitably (since its audits are ineffective). A
sufficiently low cap on penalties produces this outcome.
As noted, a cap on penalties is necessary to support both separating and
pooling outcomes. In both cases the cap serves to constrain the behavior of strong
bureaus by eliminating profitable alternative actions that would lead the equilibria
to unravel. Whether pooling instead of separation emerges depends on the costs of
audits and the agent’s reasoned assessment of the auditing bureau’s capability. If
the cost of audits is high, a weak bureau can more easily mimic because a strong
bureau will be more reluctant to audit (the cost is higher). That is, as audit costs
increase, the effective difference between bureau types shrinks. If the agent
believes that the bureau is likely bad at auditing, mimicking will be harder. If
these two factors work in the right direction—penalties are modest and agents
believe that there is a reasonable possibility that the audits are effective—weak
bureaus may be able to mimic strong bureaus.
One of the consequences of a pooling equilibrium is that audits will have to
be more frequent to induce accurate reporting. The reason is that agents will
suspect that the bureau may be weak, reducing the incentive to report accurately
for any given audit rate and penalty.
To illustrate, consider a pooling equilibrium where High agents always
report honestly (the highlighted pooling equilibrium in the table). Assume the
same numbers as in the example above and suppose additionally that 20% of
bureaus are weak and 80% are strong (and the maximum penalty is 6.5). If both
types of bureaus adopt the same auditing strategy where a fraction α>0 of low
reports are audited, then a High agent reports truthfully if and only if the expected
costs of a low report are worse than of a high report:

Hence, the audit rate must be 60% (or greater) for a High agent to report
truthfully. The profit level of a typical bureau in this case is 5 because,

0.8 ( 5 − 0.6 × 2.5 ) + 0.2 ×11 =
5.
This result, with a bounded penalty and much mimicry, audit rates must go
up, means that an outcome with mimicking is costly, a point we return to in the
next section.
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The possibility of mimicry opens a new avenue for the use of SRA
strategies, namely in areas of the law where agents will be unsure about the
capabilities of a regulatory bureau. For example, financial regulators may not be
able to monitor banks and other financial entities (which we generically term
banks) so as to control the risk externalities they impose, e.g., by taking on
excessive effective leverage. Banks may be one step ahead of the regulator who
cannot pay its employees to investigate anywhere near the amounts that banks can
pay theirs to camouflage their risk levels. This lack of regulator capabilities is
arguably at the center of the design of modern financial regulation, including the
Dodd-Frank rules, the bank capital rules, and so forth. How can we regulate if the
regulators are systematically outmanned? Even if they could pay the same, but
had far too few resources to monitor all banks, the same problem would apply.
Suppose that we require banks to report compliance with some underlying
goal and announce an audit rule based on those reports. For example, we could
ask banks to report on their capital levels or what they expect their capital levels
would be under various levels of stress or various economic scenarios. The bureau
would then decide whether to audit the bank and its report. The risk of audit
would be based on the report that the bank submits, and would go up if the bank
reported higher levels of capital, the strategic equivalent of a low report in the
income tax example.
Similarly, issuers of securities apparently get each offering graded by a
rating agency. An alternative to this system of direct monitoring would have
issuers grade their own securities, and then submit the grade (and presumably
background materials) to a rating bureau. The bureau would audit some fraction
of the reports. Issuers who report a high grade (which corresponds to what we
called a low-income report in the tax example) would have a higher risk of audit,
and would suffer a significant downgrade or other penalty if they were found to
have over graded.
To work, the design of this audit mechanism must induce the bank to send
in truthful reports even if the bank thinks there is a possibility that the bureau
cannot effectively audit. 26 If, for example, a bureau with weak auditing
capabilities can mimic one with strong capabilities, banks may send in truthful
reports to a weak agency. If banks believe that audit bureaus are weak or audits
are costly for bureaus, the SRA strategy may be ineffective. But the converse is
26

Self-reports also have the virtue that banks may face sanctions from the public if they submit
reports that downplay risk and there is a subsequent failure. They will be seen as not only failing
but also as lying.
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also true. The SRA strategy may achieve regulatory leverage in arenas where
effective regulation was thought not possible. This suggests that strategies that
change agents’ guesses about auditing capacities may be important. The greater
the likelihood that a bureau is strong, the greater the temptation to mimic. For
example, the IRS strategy of publicizing tax fraud prosecutions just prior to April
15 may induce truthful reporting if such accounts change agents’ beliefs about the
IRS’ capabilities.
This strategy could apply beyond the regulatory arena, for example, in the
grading of any product. Thus, Consumer Reports could apply it to grading
products, and universities could apply it to grading exams for at least some
massive open online courses (MOOCS). Any time that agents can assess their
own performance, they can be asked to grade themselves, with penalties—
possibly just pure information—if the oversight bureau has the potential to audit
them and penalize misreports.
3.4 Externalities across bureaus.
Our model of a bureau is of an entity enforcing a single stricture on an
agent, such as mandating a single type of pollution control equipment or imposing
a tax on a single type of income. Real bureaus enforce many strictures. The IRS
must enforce taxes on wage income, dividends, gains from domestically held
investments, income hidden in tax havens, and numerous other sources. The EPA,
even when considering a single-type of pollution, may have a variety of mandates
or fees to deal with differently-situated agents. Stepping up one level in authority,
a single department in the government may encompass many complex bureaus.
The executive oversees many departments.
If policies must cover many bureaus (in the narrow sense of our model),
they must be set to consider the interaction of SRA strategies across bureaus. The
possibility of both mimicry and differentiation (signaling) make this a complex
problem. The reason is that agents observing the behavior of one bureau may
make inferences about other bureaus.
Weak bureaus can impose negative externalities on strong bureaus.
Consider a pooling equilibrium, where weak bureaus mimic strong bureaus. As
illustrated by our example, if agents cannot tell what type of bureau they are
facing, it will take more audits to convince agents that it is desirable to report
accurately. The weak bureau forces the strong bureau to incur greater auditing
costs, thus creating a negative externality.
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Perhaps surprisingly, weak bureaus can also impose positive externalities
on strong bureaus. If allowable penalties are large and agents think they may be
facing a weak bureau, they may sometimes underreport, in a semi-separating
equilibrium. Strong bureaus may benefit because they will collect penalties when
they catch the underreporting.
The net effect, a positive or negative externality, will depend on the
parameters of the problem. In general, each type of bureau will prefer that there
are more of the other type. When almost all bureaus are strong, mimicry becomes
attractive. A weak bureau can get lost in the crowd of its strong cousins. When
almost all bureaus are weak, misreports will be abundant, and strong bureaus will
catch and penalize a lot of misreporters.
Acknowledging trade-offs across bureaus, the best policy may be complex,
and policies that initially seem misguided may in fact be making this trade-off
correctly. For example, it is often observed that the audit and penalty rate for
inaccurate tax returns is too low to induce tax compliance, because under
reporting has a lower expected cost than honest reporting. If, however, a higher
penalty rate would allow agents to infer in which areas the IRS is strong and
which areas it is weak, overall tax compliance might even go down. A low
penalty and audit rate may be desirable given the externalities across areas of tax
compliance even though if we look at a single area, it looks suboptimal. We are
only speculating on the possibility, but it is clear that once one considers the
complexity of the setting, casual intuitions that penalties or audits need to be
increased may be incorrect.
4.

Conclusion

We conclude by suggesting further lines of research on SRA strategies.
Our model includes only two types of agents and two types of bureaus. In reality,
there are many types, and extending the model to many times would be
worthwhile, and could lead to qualitatively different results. In addition, our
model is of a single bureau. Formally modeling multiple bureaus operating
simultaneously is likely a difficult task but may yield insights.
Another important extension would allow for probabilistic rather than
certain detection of misreports by strong bureaus. People presumably would vary
in their ability to avoid detection. For example, high income taxpayers might be
more capable of hiding monies that low-income taxpayers, and within an income
class, some, e.g., the self-employed, would be better hiders than others, e.g.,
salaried employees. This possibility may lead to different, perhaps dramatically
different, results.
20

Given constraints on government resources and investigative capabilities,
SRA strategies are inevitable. Indeed, many are already in place. Their operation
creates a subtle game where agents withhold information from bureaus, some
bureaus signal to reveal information, and others mimic to hide it. Casual
interpretation of bureau behavior may be incorrect. For example, higher penalties
may not lead to greater compliance and bureaus may not want to employ SRA
strategies that yield high audit hit rates. In addition, our results suggest that there
may be many critical areas where legal rules can be fruitfully enforced through
SRA mechanisms. For example, we suggested the possibility that bank regulation
may be a good area for relying on an SRA mechanism. Future work should
explore the broad potential for SRA mechanisms in fostering cost/effective
regulation.
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